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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ARTHUR

GRAH~\~I,

Pla,intiff and Respondent
and Cross-Appella!nt,

Case No.

vs.
EVAN E. STREET and
SIEGEL,

~IAX

7883

Defendants and Appellarnts
and Cross-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT, MAX SIEGEL

STATEl\IENT OF THE FACTS
This case was decided below in two parts. First,
there was a decision determining the question of liability
of the defendants. This dete-rmination was appealed
(166 P. 2d 524) and the judgment against defendants
1
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sustained. Second, was the determination of the extent
of plaintiff:s remedy against defendants, which is now
appealed.
The wide difference between the parties arises from
the granting of a judgment for $5,000.00 as damages
for alleged mental suffering and $5,000.00 more as
punitive damages. r:rhese were allowed in addition to
the partnership accounting of profits arising from the
partnership basis of liability as decided on the first
appeal; and which partnership accounting is not in substantial dispute.
There is also now a cross-appeal herein based on
still another claim of recovery or damage, i.e., on the
alleged rental value of partnership equipment.
We will try to state the facts material to all the
contentions, and essential to an understanding of the
present issues, but will not attempt to now present all
that may be claimed on plaintiff's cross-appeal if that
is urged.
Plaintiff first filed complaint :May 13, 1944. This
complaint (R. 389) was against Evan Street alone as
defendant. It alleged a parol partnership agreement
made about September 1, 1943, between these two parties,
to acquire and operate caterpillar tractor equipment
and divide the profits. It recited that defendant, Street,
had "conspired with other parties * * * to exclude the
plaintiff from any management or control of said partnership business." (R. 380). The prayer so far as now
2
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material was for "an
as may be just...

aeeountin~,

mHl

~ueh other

reliPI'

~-\.fter answer by defendant Ntreet, an arnended con1plaint was filed by one of plaintiff's present attorneys
(396) on ~-\.pril 11, 19-15. As this Court on fin~t appeal
pointed out. this c01nplaint pleaded s01ne detail, but
did not change the theory or sub::-:tance of the first complaint. It added defendant Siegel a~ a party, and added,
as allegations of the partnership agreernent, that the
"equipment was to be operated" by defendant Street
(397), "for the sum of $1.~5 per hour," and also that
Street was "placed in charge of the equiprnent." (398).
Also that defendants ·•continued to operate the said
equipment * * * until January 10, 1945," when they
sold it (400).

As to defendant Siegel, this alleged additionally
that he paid $4,500.00 for the equipment and that the
Bill of Sale ran to hin1. Also, that the money frorn the
operation of it had been turned over to him (401).
After trial on this con1plaint and the answers, findings (84), and an "Interlocutory and Decree" (89) were
entered on June 15, 1945. The finding recited the allegations of the complaint. The conclusions of law were
followed in the decree and these recited ( 89) that a
partnership was entered into and still continued to exist.
That its assets consisted of the caterpillar equipment
described and which the defendants had been operating.
Both defendants were ordered to file ''an accounting"
within 20 days. This requirement was stated at some

3
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length (90) and required that it cover a cmnplete partnership accounting in every detail with all receipts and
expenses (90). ~ here was no distinction as between the
two defendants as to the theory of their liability found,
or in the nature of the judgrnent against each of them,
or the requirernent of accounting. r.rhere was, however,
an added recital that the defendant Siegel have an offset
for the $4,500.00 paid by hiin for the equipment (90).
The Court retained jurisdiction "to settle all account~
between the parties hereto, dissolve the partnership,***
and to ruake such other order as may be just and equitable * * *."
1

The opinion of this Court on the appeal from this
judgment (166 P. 2d 524) is important and helpful as
showing the issues pleaded, the supporting evidence,
and particularly the basis and theory of defendant's
liability, and of plaintiff's remedy.
This opinion describes the nature of the case and
of the decree below in the first paragraph, p. 526, as
follows:
"Appeal from an interlocutory decree and
the findings in support of it, holding that a partnership had been formed between plaintiff Graham and defendant Street on August 6, 1943,
and that Street and Siegel through connivance
diverted frorn plaintiff the use of partnership
property and the partnership earnings, and ordering an accounting."
The opinion after referring to the procedures above
recited said :

4
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"The cmnplaint • * •, sets forth an action
in equity, the rery core of which is the fraudulent
action of the defendants, Street and Siegel, in
conniu,ing to undo a partnership between Grahmn
and Street, and to keep frmu Grahan1 the prope,rty
and fruits of his alleged partnership with Street."
'"The allegations of plaintiff's partnership
with Street are necessary and prelin1inary to
arrive at the part that Street and Siegel played
in disrupting the relationship of Graham and
Street * * •."

•••

"The gist of the cause for complaint is the
action of Siegel and Street in disrupting the
partnership of Graham and Street and defrauding Grahan1. The prayer reveals the nature of
the relief demanded, to-wit, 'that an accounting
be taken of all the monies colleeted by the defendants and each of them' * * *." (P. 527, par.
3-5).
Further with relation to Siegel and what is called
"fraud," the opinion (p. 528, par. 6-7) says:
"It is * * *logical to conceive of the complaint
as constructed about the ,central transactions
whereby Siegel allegedly insinuated himself in
the Graham and Street relationship * * * ."
"Siegel * * * not succeeding in getting Graham to agree to a 1nodification of what was a
loan agreement, he then used his title in connivance with Street to divert what was in reality
Graham-Street equipment * * * to his own purposes • • *." (p. 529).

..
""

"All that is asked in this action is to declare

5
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the status of the parties, the status of the equipment, and to obtain an accounting if it is found
that a partnership existed between Graham and
Street and that such partnership owned the equity
in the equipment bought * '1., *." (p. 530).
Coming then to basic elements of plaintiff's right to
relief, the opinion at p. 530, para. 10 asks:
"Was there a partnership between Graham
and Street 1"
It sustains the trial court in its holding that there
was, and quotes and approves the trial court's finding:
•·'rhat defendants have conspired to take possession of the partnership property of Graham
and Street, to collect and misappropriate the
funds earned in the operation of the equipment
* * *, and to exclude plaintiff from any management or control of said partnership business***."
As the basis for sustaining the trial court's decision
of the continuation of this partnership, which had no
agreed term of existence, the opinion said :
"A partnership at will may be dissolved by
one partner unequivocally bringing home notice
to the other partner that he no longer intends
to be a partner." Citing a number of cases at p.
535, par. 17.
"On September 22, (1943) * * * there was
talk of each buying out the other; that Street
was willing to take his wages and call it quits;
that Siegel was willing to take $300.00 for his
'interest' and let Grahmn have the 'cat'. But no
agreement was reached. Graham thought his
interest worth at least $1,000.00. They parted
without any agreement to terminate; therefore
(;
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there was no tern1ination on that date."
535, par. 16).

(p.

"If the partnership ceased to exist in fact
by the conduct Street brought home· to Grahmn
or by the answer of Street denying the partnership filed May 29, Hl-!-!, whirh must be considered
notice to Graham, or after the sale of the property
on January 12, 1945, eqnity will nevertheless treat
the partnership as e;1_·istin,rJ and require an accounting of the profits. Equity will not per1nit
a party in a relationship of trust and confidence
to pro fit from his o·wn wrong." ( p. 535, par. 19).
** *
"In this case Street used property belonging
to the partnership treating it as belonging to
Siegel, refusing to account to Graham for the
monies collected for the use of the tractor, but the
property will in eqttity be considered as being
used for the benefit of the Graha~Stree:t pa.rtnership, an accounting of profits to be made to
this partnership." (p. 535, par. 18).
"The decree of the lower Court, dated .June
15, 1945, is affirmed." (p. 536).
This opinion is dated February 15, 1946. On petition for rehearing, certain words in the next to the last
paragraph were stricken out (434). These words are
therefore left out in the above quotation. The final
remittitur on this appeal was issued July 29, 1946 (427),
and was filed August 1, 1946 ( 445).
The accounting as ordered by the court of the defendants was filed herein September 3, 1946 (17). A
pleading ter1ned "objections to accounting by defend-

7
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ants and supplemental complaint" was then filed October
2, 1946. In this, plaintiff (17) made objection that the
accounting was 'contrary' to the former decree in some
parts ( 18) and also set forth some affirmative allegations in paragraphs 9 to 17 on which was predicted a
claim for rejection of the accounting remedy, and for
recovery of the rental value of the equipment, as damaged.
Since there are no findings on these allegations or
sustaining this claim or theory of damage at all, these
allegations and the evidence in support thereof, need
not be pursued now. The failure to make findings or
give judgment on this claim is, we believe, the basis
of defendant's cross-appeal which can be appropriately
1net, ,if we get to that.
There is, however, another allegation which is more
material on the appeal. This is par. 19 of this pleading
(20) which says:
"That in equity and good conscience the
accountings made by the defendants and each of
them should be rejected for the reasons hereinabove set forth, and the accounting made on a
rental basis as hereinabove set forth;"
The prayer on this (21) asks:
"That the accountings and each of them made
by the defendants herein be rejected by this
court."
The prayer is then devoted mostly to this claim for
damages as rental on the equipment (21) "in the sum

8
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c

of $jj,756.00, and for the further su1n of $1,~71.00 pt>r
month," frmn the date of this pleading and also $88,777.33 for loss of "'future rentals.''
\Ye find no allegation in this plentling with reference to dmnages for 1nental suffering or for damag<>s
at all, except this one for rental Yalue dmnages, and
nothing relating to punitiYe dmuages, in any way. 1-Iowever, before leaving it, we point out that during the
trial and on motion granted by th~ trial court (17~),
there was inserted by ink in the prayer only (21):

"YII. That the defendants and each of then1 pay
to the plaintiff the su1n of $50,000.00 as
punitiYe damages.''
This amendment was over our objections that there
was no pleading to support this added paragraph (172).
After defendant's answers to the supplemental cornplaint of plaintiff, were filed ( 44, 58) which included and
brought the accounting up-to-date by slight additions
(62), (66), and the furnishing of additional information
as requested by plaintiff (55) ; and after the court had
sustained plaintiff's motion to strike out a good deal
of the defendant's answers including their affirmative
defenses (4-2), the case went to second trial January 3,
1951 (135).
1llat erial Facts on Second Trial

The partnership equipment was added to, by the
purchase of a belt loader by Mr. Siegel Octobe-r 6, 1943
(192). This was necessary additional equipment to elevate the loosened dirt out of the basements so that it

9
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could be rnoved away (278). The small service truck,
also purchased by him was necessary to pick up parts
for the tractor, make necessary trips, and haul tank~
of diesel fuel for the partnership equipment (280).
The partnership equipment was in poor condition
when procured from Bothwell in 1943, and needed a
cornplete overhaul. Such job would have cost from
$2,500.00 to $3,000.00 (315) or $2,750.00 (243) if done
at a shop equipped for such work. Appellant thought
that he could have done all that he could do in overhauling for about $2,000.00 (314).
Defendant Street did replace parts and repair it
so as to keep it going up to January, 1944, and then
when it could not be operated, he engaged an old building, and with some assistance did a partial job of rebuilding and repairing (290-293). This was not new or up-todate equipment (288). The partnership equipment new
would have cost at least $12,500.00 (253). And even if
new, it could depreciate about one-third in value in about
sixty (60) days of use (236) and would steadily require
replacement and repairs (238-239).
They had work for this equipment during the whole
period of possession and operated it always, except
for break-downs (290) and bad weather (280). In January, the ground became so frozen that they couldn't
do much. Except when so prevented, the equipment
was operated continuously (270-280) and at the full
going rate of pay (281).
It was sold January 12, 1945, by Mr. Street, before

10
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he joined the Navy, for the agreed price of $4,500.00,
and this amount c_harged to illr. Siegel in the account
(54). The sale was to Stanley Roberts (3~) who had
previously hauled the equip1uent for JHr. Street to different parts of the state, where Street had operated it
(3:2:2). Roberts contracted to pay J\!Ir. Siegel only
$4,056.00, however ( 32-!, 398), because they were indebted
to Roberts for a balance due for hauling the equipment
of about $400.00, which was deducted (32-!). At the
time of trial, January 1951, there was still $4,000.00
of this $4,056.00 still unpaid to l\Ir. Siegel (197). This
was six years after the sale.
The equipment when sold to l\Ir. Roberts was in
bad repair (325-328), and repairs and replacements from
1945 to about 1948 took more than the receipts from the
operation of it. He had to borrow $1,750.00 to make up
this loss (345). He testified that this partnership equipment was old in model and was not in demand by "cat
skinners" or those requiring work, or for rental by
operators ( 349-350).
The accounts from which the accounting was made
by defendants were kept in a book, Exhibit "N", by Mr.
Street and his wife (173). The receipts were entered
there along with the records of the jobs he was employed
on, and of his time. Expenses, except son1e out-of-pocket
payments (160) paid by him, were also entered in this
book. Except for such small expense payments, all
receipts were turned over to Mr. Siegel who receipted
in the book (193), Exhibit "N", for them, and all the
11
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payments of bills and invoices were first checked by
Mr. Street (193) and paid by the check of Siegel on the
"special account" kept for this operation. The defendants checked up on each other, for their own protection
( 193), and agreed on the payrnents to be made out of
the account ( 177). r~eheir respective accounts on the
whole operation reconciled with each other within $25.20
(6, 53, 175).
Street did not charge Graham, or in the accounting-,
for the time he spent in arranging for jobs, collectingfor work done, or the keeping of accounts or like work
(300-301).
The disputed accounting item of insurance, $170.57,
on page 6 of the account (180) was for liability insurance on the partnership equipment (184) and was paid
for, at the going rate for such insurance (192). Every
account paid was approved by l\1r. Street before a check
was issued (145) and this charge for this amount was
so approved, and set up as expenses in his accounting
(13).
While the defendant Street was so taking care of
and operating the equipment and the business was so
carried on, plaintiff was operating the Probst, Clyde &
Graham similar equipn1ent and in 1945 he received
therefrom one-third the profits in addition to his hourly
payment as an operator (264, 169). In the fall of 1943
when the partnership equipment went to American Fork,
he moved his equipment to Heber for work contracted
there and to "get away from Orem," as had been in-

12
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tended (~63). He hin1self arquired thi::; other equipment
from Probst & Clyde in 19-!-! ( 269) and thereafter operated it for himself. He got additional equipment in 1945
(267) and later substantially 1nore equip1nent, all of
which he was operating prior to and at the tiine of the
trial (:ZG7). He received as 1nuch per day for his equipment as Street received (270).
POINrrs RELIED UPON

I.
There is no basis in the pleading, or in the evidence,
or in law for the award by the trial court of:
(a)

Compensatory dan1ages, for mental suffering,
or at an, or

(b)

Punitive damages (118, 122).
II.

It was error to charge against the Defendants the
sum of $1,932.00 for so-called "idle time" of partnership
equipment.
III.
It was error to strike from aecounting the expense
item of $170.57 paid for liability insurance on the partnership equipment (116).

IV.
It was error to charge interest on balance of the
account on the partnership accounting; especially
to charge interest for seven years after 1946 when the
13
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accounting was rendered by defendants as ordered, and
it was ever since rejected by plaintiff (121, 122).

v.
It was error to reject and strike defendant's allegations and to refuse to consider plaintiff's laches or inequitable delays, inequitable claims, and inequitable conduct and failure to do or offer to do equity (462, 45-50).

BRIEF AND ARGUl\fENT
POINT I.
THERE IS NO BASIS IN THE PLEADING,
OR IN THE EVIDENCE, OR IN LAW FOR THE
AWARD BY THE TRIAL COURT OF: (a) COMPENSATORY DAMAGES, FOR MENTAL SUFFERING, OR AT ALL, OR (b) PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
The point of law is that there can be no recovery of
damages at all for acts udisrupting1 ' or "to undo" or for
causing dissolution, of a partnership at will, or for excl1tsion of plaintiff from participation in the partnership
as it was continued by the Court in equity.
These are the only delicts relied upon for relief by
plaintiff. There can, therefore, be no recovery of the
damages here allowed, because :
(1)

The law does not permit such.

(2)

If the law did permit it, there is no such
claim pleaded, or proved.

(3)

The election to affirm the partnership relationship and obtain an accounting in equity,
bars a claim for damages for breach.

As quoted from the opinion of the Court supra, this
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action is one brought in equity and for a partnership
accounting. The ren1edy by accounting obtained in equity
is the only redress which the pleaded theory of action,
will support. The trial Court, notwithstanding that this
partnership agreement was without any ter1n of existence, nevertheless held that the partnership had continued to exist, in order to require defendants to account.
This Court thus sustained the findings that the
partnership had continued, but it was necessary to supply
the equitable fictions as above quoted in order so to do.
This continuation of the partnership for the purpose of
requiring an accounting can supply no basis for assessing damages in addition to the amount due under the
accounting.
This Court, 1n fact, stated and supported the law
with relation to partnerships at will (166 P. 2d p. 535,
par. 17) as follows:
"A partnership at will n1ay be dissolved
by one partner unequivocally bringing home
notice to the other partners that he no longer
intends to be a partner. Pierce v. Feno, 'Sup.,
184 NYS 851; Brady v. Powers, 112 App. Div.
845, 849, 850, 98 NYS 273; Spears v. Willis, 151
NY 443, 449, 45 NE 849; Houston v. :McCrory,
140 Old. 21, 282 P. 149."
But, nevertheless, held that to prevent "a party
in a relationship of trust and confidence to profit from
his own wrong," the partnership "properties will in equity
be considered as being used for the benefit of the· Graham
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and Street partnership and accounting of profits required
to be made to thispartnership."
There are three matters, the mention of which, will
clear the way for the citation of authorities.
First, there is no claim alleged or found that the
contract here was for a "joint undertaking" for a particular job, or what is termed a "particular undertaking."
The whole case and on both trials has been based on a
continuing partnership covering at least 50 to 70 different scattered jobs . (9, 11, and Exhibit "N"), and 15
months.
Second, there is no claim alleged or based on any
conduct or delict other than the "conspiring" or "conniving" to undo a partnership and to keep from Graham
the property and fruits of his alleged partnership; or,
as otherwise stated, it is the "part that Street and Siegel
played in disrupting the partnership." (P. 527).
So while the term "fraud" is used, particularly in
discussing other points in the opinion, where it is said
that Mr. Siegel agreed to make a loan and then claimed
to be the owner instead of the mortgage holder in order
to make a better deal and that he "insinuated himself
into the Grahan1-Street partnership;" no claim for relief
is based, or raised by any allegations, or at all, in so far
as these acts by themselves were concerned. He would
have a right to refuse to make a loan. These acts are
cited in the opinion on first appeal only in establishing
the so-called conspiracy to disrupt or "undo." However,
16
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nothing is better settled than that no cause of action
arises from a Inere conspiracy to do sOinething.
llloropoulos vs. Fuller (Cal.), 200 P. 601, 604.

A conspiracy merely has the effect of bringing in,
and charging, others with actionable or unlawful acts
committed. It has been held, ~Ir. Siegel was so brought
in here, but as the case just cited shows relief n1ust be
based upon the acts which the conspirators join to com• mit, and it is not sufficient merely to allege a "conspiracy
to defraud plaintiff."
The acts here complained of and found we-re acts "to
undo" this partnership at will. Thus they tried to deprive
plaintiff of the fruits of the operation of the partnership property, but this, the Court of equity prevented by
treating Mr. Siegel as a mortgagor though he held the
legal title, and treating the partnership as continuing
even though it was not that kind of partnership.
The third matter, mention of which will help to
clarify the situation here, is that the equitable relief of
an accounting was, necessarily, rested upon the basis
that this property of the partnership, and which was
operated by defendants, would, "in equity, be considered
as being used for the benefit of Graham-Street partnership and accounting of profits required to be made to
this partnership."
Thus, it is obvious, that if Street had just quit or
withdrawn from the contemplated partnership arrangement to get and operate some equipment, there would
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be no cause of action, even for accounting. Or, if it had
proceeded to the point where the equipment was acquired,
and he had simply refused to go on with the project
and had not taken and used the equipment, there would
be no cause. It could not change this situation if he
were induced so to act by Siegel. The use of partnership
property supplied the basis for the accounting.
So, on these bases, the judgment for an accounting
as entered below was sustained by this Court on first
appeal.
In fact, this Court said ( p. 530) :
"All that is asked in this action is to declare
the status of the parties, the status of the equipment and to obtain an accounting* * *."

I.

No Legal Right to Damages.

That the law does not permit recovery of damages
for the attempt to undo or disrupt a partnership at will
is supported both by the cases and by our statute. It
rests fundamentally, of course, on the law as quoted
from the decision of this Court above that any partner
has a right to terminate, disrupt, or undo such a partnership.
40

Am. Jur., p. 461, sec. 482:
"Wrongful Dissolution of Partnership during Term Stipulated in Articles. It has frequently
been decided that the partnen;hip
not preclude the n1aintenance of an
by one partner against the other
for a breach of the copartnership

relation does
action at law
for damage~
agreement in
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wrongfully dissolving the partnership duriu9 llu~
term, provided the plaintiff has kept his covenants. • • • The right depends on the fact that
such dissolution is brought about in violation of
the agreement between the partners. If a firw
is one dissolrable at will, 110 rigld to reco1wr
darna.ges 1rill rrsult from i.ts disruptio'l'l."
The note to this cites, mnong other case~, BttrnstiPn
vs. Giest, 15 N.Y.S. (2) -!S, which case eited the rule
from R.C.L; SfPzcart vs. Ulrich C\Vash.), 201 P. 16, 19.
This case on its facts is smnewhat similar to the one
at bar as is also indicated fron1 the following frmn the
opinion:

"The complaint being silent as to the time
when the partnership would tenninate, we 1nust
asssume that it would tenninate with the lease.
Zimmerman v. Harding (227 U.S. 489, 33 Sup.
Ct. 387, 57 L. Ed. 608), or that it might be tenninated at will without giving rise to a cause of
action to recover damages for its disruption (20
R.C.L. 927, Sec. 142). In either event, with the
certainty that it must terminate February 1, 1920,
or sooner, if respondent so willed, the gist of the
complaint is that respondent concealed the fact
that he had made an agreement to conduct a
similar business in the premises with or for,
Durkin, the owner, and thus procured the execution of the second contract, which definitely
terminated the copartnership, and made disposition of its assets. * * * So, too, after the termination of the copartnership Ulrich had an absolute
right to engage in any business he pleased, with
whom he pleased, and owed no duty to advise his
partners in advance of his affairs."
19
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20 R.C.L., P. 927, Sec. 142:

"A suit may also be maintained for the act
of a copartner in dissolving the firm before the
period limited by the articles of copartnership.
• • • The right to recover damages for the dissolution of a partnership depends, however, on
the fact that such dissolution is brought ahout
in violation of the agreement between the partners. If a firm is one dissolvable at will no right
to recover damages will result from its disruption."
This last sentence is supported by a case there cited
from Montana, and also a note. 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 959.
So, also, our statutes plainly adopt and enact the
rule just quoted.
"69-1-35 U.C.A. 1943: Rights of Partners to
Application of Partnership Property.
"(1) When dissolution is caused in any way,
except in contravention of the partnership agreement, each partner, as against his copartners and
all persons claiming through them in respect of
their interests in the partnership, unless otherwise agreed, may have the partnership property
applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus
applied to pay in cash the net amount owing to
the respective partners. But if dissolution is
caused by expulsion of a partner, hona fide· under
the partnership agreement, and if the expelled
partner is discharged from all partnership liabilities either by payment or agreement under
section 69-1-33 (2), he shall receive in cash only
the net amount due him frorn the partnership.
"(2) When dissolution is caused in contra20
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'Vention of the partner~hip ngrPement the rights
of the partners shall be as follows :

••(a) Each partner who has not caused dissolution wrongfully shall haY~:

.. 1. All the rights specified in paragraph (1)
of this section ; and,

•·2. The right as again8t each partner who
has caused the dissolution wrongfully
to damages for breach of the agreeinent. ''
So, under (1), if delict of causing dissolution or
attempting ·'to undo" was not "in contravention of the
partnership agreement," as it plainly was not here, or
if the "dissolution" were caused "by expulsion" ( exclusion), then the right of plaintiff is to have the partnership bills paid, and to receive "in cash only the net
amount due him from the partnership." We have been
tendering this exact relief ever since 1946.
On the other hand, under part ( 2) above, if such
dissolution or attempt "to undo" had been "in contravention of the partnership agreement," the plaintiff
as the partner not causing "dissolution wrongfully would
be entitled to damages for breach of the agreement."
But, as above demonstrated, the attempt to end or ending
of partnership with no agreed term of existence cannot
be a "violation of the agreement." The following statute
makes this even plainer.
69-1-28.

Dissolution is caused:

"(1) Without violation of the agreen1ent
between the partners :
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"(b) By the express will of any partner
when no definite term or particular undertaking
is specified."
Dissolution is caused:
"(2) In contravention of the agreement between the partners, where the circumstances do
not permit a dissolution under any other provision of this section, by the express will of any
partner at any time."
Plainly then, by the first paragraph, "dissolution"
of this partnership or defendant's acts "to undo" it were
"without violation" because it was dissolvable by the
"express will of any partner." There can be no difference
in the meaning of the words "violation," "breach," "contravention" as used in these two statutes.
And note also that under part "(2)" again, it would
be "in contravention" if the circumstances of the case
did not permit dissolution "by the express will of any
partner," and conversely, of course, it would not be in
"contravention" if "dissolvable" by the "express will"
of a partner as this Court has held, as quoted above,
that this partnership was. (166 P. 2d 235, par. 17).
While these statutes repeatedly use the word dissolution in referring to the acts affecting liability, the
following definition shows that it plainly covers what
was attempted here, as found by this Court.
69-1-26.

Dissolution Defined.

"Th~ dissolution of a partnership is the
change in the relation of the partners caused by
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any partner eeasing to he n~~oeiated in the earrying on, as distingui~lwd frmn the winding- np,
of the business."

E.rclus1:on. of Partner Gi.res Xo Riplit to Damages:
If anything is claiined, or could be clainwd, hy reason
of the fact that plaintiff was exeluded from the partnPrship operation or the possession of the equipment as this
Court and the trial Court said plaintiff was (118), this
does not entitle hiin to the damages allowed.
There has been maintained in law a definite distinction as to remedy, between disruption of a partnership in violation of a contract for an agreed term, and
the exclusion of a partner from a partnership operation
which is continued by another partner.
69-1-19.

Right to an Account.

"Any partner shall have the right to a formal
account as to partnership affairs: (1) If he is
wrongfully excluded from the partnership business or possession of its property by his copartners."
This is in harmony with the first paragraph of
69-1-35 dealing with an "expelled partner." This says if
"dissolution," i.e., "change in the relation of the partners
is caused by any partner ceasing to be associated'?
(69-1-26), "by expulsion of a partner" operating under
a bona fide partnership agreement, and the "expelled
partner" is discharged from debts, as is here the case,
he shall have only the accounting and "net amount" due
from this.
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40 Am. J ur ., p. 462, Sec. 483 :

"Measure of Damages-In case of a breach
of the partnership agreement by dissolution, the
damages recoverable include the value of the
profits which the plaintiff otherwise would have
received, or the value to him of the continuance
of the agreement during the covenanted term,
that is, prospective or anticipated profits. In the
case of a partner wrongfully excluded from the
business, he is entitled to his share of the profits
on the completion of the venture."
The note to the last sentence of the foregoing quotation cites the following Utah case which was sustained
by the Supreme Court of the United States and which
is in point. The note also cites an annotation in 4 A.L.R.
156.

Karrick vs. Hannaman. This case is in 9 Utah 236
and on appeal to the Supreme Court in 168 U.S. 328,
42 L. Ed., 8 S. Ct. 135.

It is quite similar to the one at bar in most essentials.
However, the partnership was for a definite five-year
term. Before expiration, one partner forceably expelled
the other and thereafter excluded him. The partner in
possession opera ted and later sold all the partnership
properties.
The Utah Court (p. 241) mentions the rule above
cited as to the partnerships at will and says:

"Where the partnership is merely at will, the
right of one partner to terminate it must be conceded."
24
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Both Courts in their discussions indicate that where
it is terminated during the definite term agreed to, there
is a cause of action for damages, but they did not treat
this exclusion as a disruption of the partnership and
therefore applied the principle that the excluded partner
was entitled to an accounting· in equity. On this the
Supreme Court said :
•·In a court of equity, a partner who, after
a dissolution of the partnership, carried on the
business with the partnership property, is liable,
at the election of the other partner or his representative to account for the profits thereof, subject to proper allowance." (Citing cases).
Nuland v. Pruyn, 216 P. 2d 526.

This is a California case discussing partnership law
on the question of damages for wrongful exclusion. The
case cites the Annotation in 80 A.L.R. 12, and, after
discussing the situation where the partnership is rightfully dissolved, the opinion says:
"On the contrary, for wrongf'ul expulsion and
continued use of assets, as found by the court,
a different rule applies generally, based upon an
assumption of a continued partnership, with full
participation in pro fits according to the ratio set
up in the articles of partnership, at least for the
period from the wrongful expulsion to actual
dissolution by circumstances or decree of court."
In view of the foregoing, it seems to be unnecessary to argue the point that even if damages were available to plaintiff here, the measure of damages is not that
allowed by the trial Court.
25
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2.

See: 4 A.L.R.159, 40 Am. Jur., P. 462.
No Pleading or Evidence Establishes Basis for
Damage:

If this were a case in which damages were available
because the conduct of defendants resulted in dissolution
in "contravention" of a partnership agreement for a
term, still there is no pleading or proof remotely related
to the damages assessed here.
We have already pointed out that the only damages
pleaded or "claimed" are for rental value or on a "rental
basis." The allegations (20) and the prayer rejected the
partnership accounting basis (21). And the trial Court
found no such damage as so alleged.
The $10,000.00 damages allowed by the Court here
(121, 122) are out of the clear sky. The findings are in
Paragraphs 4 to 18 (118). They are, briefly:
That the denial of Graham's rights "resulted in great
turmoil and anxiety in his mind."
That he had "the entree upon construction work at
American Fork" which "carried the responsibility" to
see that the work he had undertaken was efficiently performed.
He was deprived "of the right to anticipate an enlargement of his business" and the right "to see that
partnership obligations were promptly and fully met."
And, "plaintiff was subjected to distress and anxieties."
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Outside of the fact that there wPre no pleading~ or
proof of any of this. the evidence in faet shows that he
never offered to take any interest or perforrr1 any of
these things. That all work was fully performed hy 1\lr.
Street as plaintiff had agreed it would be. rrhat plaintiff, on the other hand, went on with his own busine~s
of operating similar equiputent and accumulating more.
It is not sho,vn that he eYer knew of, or cared anything
about any claims of creditors. He, by his own testi1nony,
was going cheerfully on, running a competing business,
making good money, and increasing his own equipn1ent
and business. This accounting was purely a windfall.
The grossly inequitable feature of this part is that
he never prosecuted this action until three months after
all of the debts were paid, including the debt to l\fr.
Siegel for the equipment, and after it was known that
a substantial profit had resulted from the operation.
In other words, he waited and speculated on the outcmne,
and there is every reason to believe that he would have
never claimed any connection with this operation, as a
partner or otherwise, if it had turned out badly from a
disaster, or any other cause, or had left debts instead
of substantial profits.
This amount of money, in addition to what he is
entitled to receive in the accotmting, is a pure and unjustifiable enrichment.
In Green v. Nelson (Utah), 232 P. 2d 776, 781, this
Court in discussing the "general rule in actions for the

27
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

breach of contracts" quotes with approval the Appellate Court of Ohio as follows:

"* * * he who seeks damages * * * bears the
burden of proof, unless a statute otherwise dictates, or knowledge is peculiarly within the possession of the other contracting party, which
must in such case bear the burden of producing
it."
The opinion of this Court then continues:
"It was also declared that in cases of breach
of contract courts should compensate but not
reward the injured party, and that courts ought
not to award punitive damages unless they are
provided for by law."
In any event, a claim for damages, if it would
follow as a remedy, must be pleaded. This requires no
citation of authority.
As to punitive damages, there are again, no pleadings whatsoever to advise us of this claim. There is
only the penned in paragraph of the prayer entered at
the trial asking $50,000.00 punitive damages.

Gilham v. Devereattx (_Mont.), 214 P. 606, lays down
the general rule that punitive damages cannot be made
the basis of recovery independent of a showing which
would entitle plaintiff to an award of actual damages.
This case in A.L.R. is followed by an Annotation, 33
A.L.R. 384 at 385, states that this is the rule to which
most of the Courts are committed. At page 389 the
author says:
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"'rhe po~ition g-t'nerally takPn in the ea~e~
above is that, in order for an award of punitive
drunages to be upheld, the plaintiff must have
alleged, proved, and been awarded aetnal damage~.··

This is then illustrated by Inany
number of pages.

ca~('~

eoYt•ring a

In Evan~ v. Gaisford, :2-±7 P. 2d 431, this Court
recently discussed the question of the comparative relation between general and punitive damages. The case
did not directly involve the point now under discussion,
but does leave the inference that there would need to be
a legal claim to compensatory damages, and that punitive
damages might not stand alone.
Note, 123 A.L.R. at 1120. This note deals with
punitive damages in cases of assault. The note at thi~
page cites a number of cases supporting a previous
Annotation in 16 A.L.R. 788 for:
"The rule that actual damages are a necessary predicate for allowance of exemplary damages."
So, it would seem that what we have said above
with relation to compensatory damages also requires a
reversal as to the $5,000.00 of punitive damages granted
by the Court.
15 Am. Jur., P. 766, Sec. 326. This section points
out that if this were "an action for damages" and if
it were alleged "that the wrong complained of was inflicted with malice, oppression, or other like circum-
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stances of aggravation, exemplary damages may be
recovered without being specially pleaded."
The author then says:
"If, however, the plaintiff indicates by his
pleading his intention to recover compensatory
damages only, the courts will not regard his
action as one for punitive damages also."

* * *
"':ro entitle a person to exemplary damages,
he must set up distinctly in his complaint the
elements that make up the basis of his claim
for such damages and must make such averments
as will advise the defendant that he will have to
meet a demand of that kind at the trial."
Another trouble about exemplary damages here is
that this case has now been made by this Court and
the trial Court a case of a partnership operation for
the benefit of plaintiff and one of the defendants. So
that whatever the former intent as to breaking up the
partnership, the Court did not pennit it to be broken
up. Therefore, there is nothing in this case now on
which to predicate punitive damages. There was a good
honest operation for plaintiff's benefit. It is not as if a
partner so operating has acted fraudulently to rob, or
to damage his partner's interest.

3.

Action for Damage, if One Existed, 1cas
Election.

Wai1,~ed

by

If we are correct in the foregoing contentions this
one need not be considered. However, we cannot escape
the conclusion that this case, being so firmly laid as one
30
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in equity for n partnership accounting, eon~tituted an
election, and waived plaintiff's eause of adion for damage, if he eYer had one. Drunages did not and could
not arise, as we haYe shown, a~ an elenwnt of recovery
in the accounting, principally because da1nagP~ cannot
rest upon acts of disrupting a partnership at will.
A~suming, howe-ver, that a partner by unauthorized
dissolution n1ay ever have both a legal right to damages
and an equitable right to a partnership accounting, does
he waive the former if he chooses the latter, by suit
to judgn1ent' One of these, of course, the latter would
rest upon the basis of right of ownership of the partnership property and the benefit of its operation. The other
claim would have to rest upon the breach of the contract,
and the taking and using of the property for the benefit
of the defaulting partner.

On the subject of election of remedies, 18 Am. Jur.
discusses this, pages 149 to 160, and the discussion there
leads quite conclusively, we think, to the inevitable conclusion that we have here an election and waiver. We
will point to some of the more pertinent statements.
18 Am. Jur., p. 151:

"31. Election of Legal, as Precluding Equitable, Remedy, and Vice V ersa.-A party who
has a choice between legal and equitable remedies
cannot ordinarily pursue them both at the same
time. The one proceeding may abate the other,
or the litigant may be com-pelled to elect which
he will prosecute."
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"An inconsistency between the legal and the
equitable remedy exists where the one proceeds
in affirmance and the other in disaffirmance of
the contract upon which the suits are based or
where relief in the one suit is predicated on title
in the plaintiff, and in the other, on title in defendant."
The election and waiver appear to be conclusive
whether based upon a waiver of tort and a suit in
assumpsit, or whether based upon an election between
two alternative contract remedies.
'See, 18 Am. Jttr., pp. 155-156 and p.158.
Cook v. Covey Ballard Co., 253 P. 196, is the leading
case in this state discussing the general 9-uestion of
election, and under the foregoing authority we appear
to have an election here, as indicated by that case (P.
199-200). The case holds that, where there are two
co-existing remedies which are alternative, the bringing
an action on one indicates a choice which waives the
other one.
1Jf oropoulos v. F,u1ler, 200 P. 601.

This case has been heretofore cited on another point.
In it, the Supreme Court of California, in passing upon
a demurrer pointed out two possible remedies existing
where the partnership was for a definite term. The
plaintiff had given his partner a mortgage, and they had
also entered upon a substantial farming and livestock
operation. The defaulting partner by fake assignment
of tbe mortgage and fake foreclosures by defendant
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a~signees

Iuanipnlated the propertiPs into the hands
of these colluding defendants.
The innocent partner elected "to sub1nit to this
wrongful appropriation * • * and to bring action for
the damages personally suffered." (P. 605). The Court
states, that "in the fonu of action elected by plaintiff
he can recoYer only for such dan1ages as would inure to
himself individually. Had he retained the business OJnd
carried it on under the terms of the partnership agreement he 1rould be held to an acco·unting to his former
partner or his assignee for their prorrortion of the net
profits and its rem.aining assets."
Since the property here was decreed to have been
so kept and operated, this election makes this latter
remedy the exclusive one, even if it had not already
been so anyway.

POINT II.
IT WAS ERROR TO CHARGE AGAINST THE
DEFENDANTS THE SUM OF' $1,932.00 FOR SOCALLgD "IDLE TL\[E" OF PARTNERSHIP EQUIPMENT.
Given here, by the pleadings and evidence and the
sustaining decree of this Court, a continuing partnership operation for the benefit of plaintiff as one of the
partners, we can see no sound legal theory upon which
he could charge the other partner at all, for time when
partnership may not have been operated.
This equipment was operated just as it was agreed
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by the partners it would be operated. That is, by defendant Street on a hourly wage basis. That is the contract
that is being enforced, in order to give plaintiff a remedy
here. His remedy, so provided him, is the right to the
partnership accounting granted and rendered, and an
equal division of net earnings.
The uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Street, as cited
above, is that the equipment was operated continuously
and at all time, except when its condition of repair or
the condition of the weather' would not permit (278, 281).
His, and also that of the other witnesses who testified
on this, was that during severe freezing weather, and
particularly in January, the equipment could not be
operated (280, 243, 276, 293-6). This equipment could not
be operated in this January of 1945, as witness Roberts
testified (325).
The Court finds (117) that "the use of the assets
* * * and the conduct of the partnership business were
carried on by Street assisted by Siegel, with reasonable
diligence, with the exception of thirty-four days." That
the rental value of the equipment for this "idle time"
was $1,932.00 ( 117). Then the Court charges the defendants and credits the partnership with this amount as
additional income, and on this, orders partner Street to
pay partner Graham one-half of this, or $966.00, out of
his own pocket.
It will be conceded, we think, that none of this was
ever received by Mr. Street and that the rental of this
equipment was never contemplated by the partnership
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agreement or eon~ ide red by the partner~ ( :28-l, :n -l-:r11).
There i~ al~o nothing in the partnership agTPPlllPnt bPingenforced here, calling for or de1nanding continuouH
operation, or the aecounting for the failure of such by
either partner. That no ~neh liability by one against
another partner ari~P~ out of a partner~hip relationship,
is indi~pntable.
\Yith this in n1ind, we make the following additional
objections to these findings and the judgn1ent based
thereon:
First, such liability could enter or become a proper
itmn of the partnership accounting only if agreed to in
the partnership agree1nent. That agreement, however,
has been pleaded, proved and defined and affirmed as one
for equal division of net profits, and the accounting as
ordered is on this basis only (90). Nothing of this unusual liability was ever before claimed or even suggested
here.
It clearly could only get into the cBse otherwise than
by agreement. (a) As a measure of damages for
breach of a partnership contract for a term, (Note 4
ALR 158) or (b) as damages in tort, for such as conversion of, or injury to partnership property. But, certainly any such cause and such damages must be pleaded
and pro,vecl, and so all that has been presented in support
of Point I applies additionally to this allowance of damages. This includes the authority cited that such damages
cannot be based on this kind of contract at all.
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8econd, if it could be claimed that Mr. Street is liable
because the duty owed to the partnership to operate the
equipment under this agreement was one by him personally, and not on the part of the partners, or either of
them, as such partners, that claim is not here either.
When the amended complaint was filed, and when the
judgment thereon was entered for this accounting, the
operation had entirely ceased and the accounting was
ordered on what had been done. If any contract or
duty had then been breached by the failure to operate
equipment by Mr. Street as an employ~e of the partnership on the hourly basis agreed, still this claim has never
been raised or suggested at all.
Thirdly, and to so charge Mr. Street as an employee,
an appropriate action would be necessary based on allegations showing this duty and the delict in respect thereto, so that he could defend.
Fourthly, and not only is there no pleading as
against him on this, but again there is no pleading at all,
purporting to make any claim against either defendant
of this character. This defendant, who was certainly not
directly charged with operating the equipment, was never
put on notice that any charge against him of this kind
would pop up after the end of the trial.
Fifthly, it is no part of the accounting or receipts
and expenses as ordered (90, 432) by the Court and which
we filed. Nor could it have been contemplated or expected as any part of a partnership accounting. Furthermore, we can find no objection or exception to the ac36
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count that was rendered, ::·ql~!)~·pst ing :.m~T such on1i:.;sion.
Sixth, there is no f'Yidence that the equipment was in
condition to operate or t•ould be operated during any of
the~E' 3-l days, so far as wP can find. r:rhere appears to
be no evidence that "defendants ust>d'' the equipment
"from ~\ngnst 6, 1943." It was elearl~· not in condition
to be used, at least not until the 1Gth when they started
on the first Oran joh (Ex . .N. p. 2). This accounts for
ten of the thirty-four days for which rental was charged.
There is likewise no evidence "that for the seventeen
days" between "Deceinher :2(i, 19-l--l- and Jan. 1:2, 1945" this
equipment was in condition to be operated or that the
weather would permit its operation. For these seventeen days, the Court charges defendants because in this
period (117) "Street kept possession thereof for hiinself and the defendant Siegel." Of course, Street had
possession of the equir)lnent - that was the agreement.
The evidence is, without dispute, that it couldn't be
operated when sold in January. In fact it was only after
ten days in the shop and costly repairs (325) that the
Buyer, ).fr. Roberts, could operate it at all and then it
was too cold ( 325).
Seventh, and this is even worse, the Court gets this
$1,932.00 (117) hy charging $773.00 per month on the
"cat" and $193.00 on the "ripsnorter blade." This is
$9G6.00 a month. But, then there is added another $966.00
for the other four days, of the 34 idle time found. Since,
as already shown, if there was any such time, it was less
than one rnonth, this total could not exceed $966.00.
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Eightly, the Court's charge of rental on the so-called
"Western ripsnorter" at "$193.00 per month" (117) appears to he without any basis. This equipment was first
referred to in evidence as "scarifier" then as a "ripper,"
and nobody seemed to he very clear about what this was
(254 ).

But the testimony of Mr. Street, is undisputed, that
whether it was a "ripper" or a "scarifier" it was never
removed from Bothwells in Salt Lake, from whom the
equipment was purchased, and was never used by Mr.
Street ( 316).
Ninth, the rental values charged appear not to be
fair or equitable. While plaintiff's e~pert witness did
testify that OP A on the same kind of equipment (except
possibly larger) would allow rent for the OP A ceiling,
and quotes the figures which appear to be based on that,
this witness also testified that he, and no one else, would
then lease out such caterpillar and bulldozer equipment
because the drastic use to which such equipment is put
depreciates it so rapidly, that actually loss would result from leasing it at these rates (235-6, 241). And
such could not ever be rented for brief periods anyway
(244). In any event, 34 days of use would have cost upkeep and depreciation.
Both the witnesses who actually operated and worked
on this equip1nent testified that it was not at any time
from the beginning, during, or at the end of this operation in condition so that it could be rented at all, (284,
325, 332).
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If the Court's finding of thirty-four days "idle time''
out of about one year and fiYe nwnths, or s01ne 51f> days,
were accepted, it would still be a pretty fair record of operation by a partner.
\Yhen this 34 days is reduced by the evidence aforesaid by about :27 days leaving only about seven, the record
is remarkable. Perhaps e-ven a better showing could have
been made, if there had been a pleading to advise us
that this question would come up or be considered at all.
There was certainly no sense or object in ~Ir. Street
not operating if he could. At that time he considered himself to be the principal beneficiary of every hour of operation. The Record is quite conclusive that, while he
didn't at that time know that he was working for plaintiff,
he performed very faithfully, and at time very difficult
service, under rugged conditions and in some severe
weather (284-305).
POINT III
IT vVAS ERROR TO STRIKE F'ROM ACCOUNTING THE EXPENSE ITEM OF $170.57 PAID FOR
LIABILITY INSURANCE IN THE PARTNERSHIP
EQUIP1IENT (116).
We have made objection to the elimination from the
accounting rendered of the credit of $170.57 paid for insurance premiums covering liability insurance on the
partnership equipment. Such insurance, of course, protects the operators agaii~st public liability.
It should be admitted that accidental injury, such
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as might be caused by operating and moving this equipment about, could very well wipe out these profits, and
take considerable more from the partners.
The trial Court in this connection, and in disallowing Siegel's telephone expenses for call~ in this operation,
said that he "did not incur" such "in the interest of the
partnership • * * but such expenses, if any, were incurred by him as an interloper * * *." We make no claim
here as to these telephone calls, even though the testimony was uncontradicted, but it is not clear whether
the disallowance of the insurance premium in (e) (116)
was on this same basis, or was because the Court didn't
believe the insurance premium was paid.
We submit that in this operation, which this Court
on appeal held would be treated in equity as an operation "by Street and Siegel" for the "benefit of the
Graham-Street partnership," any fair and reasonable
expenses incurred and paid are a proper partnership
expense. This is such. And to disallow it, because it was
paid by Mr. Siegel, is to do violence to this Court's decision. On this basis all expense items could be disallowed, because 1\fr. 'Siegel paid them practically all, and then
there could be no accounting as ordered.
The evidence, if that is the basis of disallowance,
has been cited above. It is undisputed that they had such
a policy, that it wast he usual policy at the "going rate,"
and the payment was made and was allowed to :Mr. Siege]
by Mr. Street in their checkup with each other, and it
40
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was entered as an expense in ~lr. Street's account (13,
1-!5, 180. 18-t, 1D:2).
Plaintiff, in his suppletnental con1plnint (18) made
eleven written objections to the account as rendered.
Many of them were specific objections, but no objection
was n1ade to this item. Questions were asked Mr.
Street by plaintiff's counsel with reference to it, along
with several iten1s in the account (174-179). There was
no more reason for us to believe that any more technical proof of this iten1 would be required than any of the
two to three hundred other items in this account (9-13)
which likewise had not been- specifically objected to. Its
payment was not put in dispute. The accounts kept were
presumably, and, under the circumstances, naturally
kept accurately.
'\Ye have not found any case directly in point in this
matter. '\Ye are all familiar with the general law in dealing with banks and in other situations, that accounts rendered under such circumstances that they would naturally
be examined will be taken, at least after a long lapse of
time, to be prima facie correct, if not objected to.
In 11 A.L.R. at Page 694 and 75 A.L.R. at P. 1289,
rases are cited under the general heading:
"The general rule that an account stated is
binding in the absence of proof of fraud or mistake is applicable to accounts stated between partners."
This may not be technically an "account stated" even
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though defendants' counsel had it for about six years
before the trial.
However, at 11 A.L.R. 604, a case is cited from Ark.
and discussed in the note by the author who states the
holding as follows:
"Where partners have had mutual dealings,
and one renders to the other a statement purporting to set forth all the items of indebtedness on
the one side and of credit on the other, the account
so rendered, if not objected to in a reasonable
time, becomes an account stated, and cannot afterwards be impeached except for fraud or mistake.''
In any event, it seems that good legal practice would
entitle us to have an item of this kind in a long account
called to our attention if objected to or disputed, or if
more technical proof is wanted. Otherwise, litigants
would be put to the necessity of producing the best evidence on every item of account, and litigation could be
interminable.
Anyway, the item and its payment were proved hy
testimony elicited mainly by defendant and not objected
to, or in any part contradicted.

POINT IV.
IT WAS ERROR rro CHARGE INTEREST OX
BALANCE OF THE ACCOUNT ON THE PARTNERSHIP ACCOUNTING; ESPECIALLY TO CHARGE
INTEREST FOR SEVEN Y E A R S AFTER 1946
WHEN THE ACCOUNTING WAS RENDERED
BY DEFENDANTS AS ORDERED, AND IT \VAS
EVER SINCE REJECTED BY PLAINTIFF.
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rl'his is an accounting between partner~ in Pquity,
so that the law with relation to the charging of interest
between partners applies. It was ordered by the trial
Court ( 90) and by this Court on appeal ( P. 535). After
the case went down, there was served and entered a
further order by the trial Court (-!3:2) advising that the
case had con1e down and directing that the accounting
ordered be filed in ~0 days. The accounting (8-16) was
filed Septen1ber 3, 1946, and settlement then tendered
on the basis thereof.
Thereafter, and after plaintiff had filed his supplemental complaint, this defendant Siegel, in his answer
thereto in 1948 added two overlooked items of receipts
(52) totaling $174.62 as found by the Court (116). Then
with this addition he reconciled his and Street's accounts
(53) and showed by his accounting total receipts of $17,2:3-±.53, and a net, in the operation account (54), of $10,039.33.

In addition to this, Mr. Siegel then charged himself
with the $4,500.00 agreed to be paid for the partner. ship equipment and also the $2,000.00 received from his
equipment and then below (54) credited himself with this
$G,500.00 and also the interest allowed on $4,500.00 paid
hy him for the partnership equipment, and also "$4,500.00" paid to Street; and by this operation reached a net
halance in the operation of $4,965.58 (54). This covered
return on all equipment including defendant's ..
The Court found a balance due plaintiff alone on this
'43
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accounting of $2,974.01 (119). This would make the total
operation earning in excess of $5,800.00.
However, it will be noticed (116) that the allowance
to Mr. Street as wages was reduced by the Court from
$1.50 claimed to $1.25 per hour, and to a total for this of
$3,480.62. The most important difference, however, is in
the allowance of the $1,932.00 as rental value for idle
time discussed in Point II above. When half of this,
$966.00, is deducted from the $2,974.01, the amount then
found due is reduced to $2,008.01, and if one-half the insurance premium of $170.57, which is $85.28, discussed
in Point III, is deducted the net balance due plaintiff is
$1,922.73.
Again in this defendant's answer, filed in 1948, he
asked that the account be settled and asked that the Court
direct him in the payment of the funds in his hands from
this operation (50). This is another tender of settlement
at that time.
A point of importance in applying the law is that this
account could have been considered and settled in 1946
when it was supplied pursuant to the Court orders, except for the contentions of the plaintiff, himself then and
ever since that this settlement should be disregarded entirely and the exhorbitant amounts claimed as rental
value paid him as damages (20) (171).

Considering the hundreds of items contained in the
account and that the changes in the actual account is in
only three or four of such items, the defendants cannot
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be held responsible for the delay in getting it checked and
settled. The Court in fact found ( 115) that the account
was filed purporting to ~et forth "the itmns of account
ordered by thi~ Court, which accounting clearly reflectH
all of the receipts to the partnership Graham and Street
during the period • • $."
The differences are only in the expenses claimed and
those allowed by the Court, and these are few and not
significant. They could have been settled shortly, at any
time. \V e have been anxious for all of these years to
get this account settled. It is plain from the record here
that plaintiff has never been willing and will not now
accept any of the funds received in this operation, or accept this method of settlement at all (171). So we can't
pay him.
There is no contract for the payment of interest here
and, of course, there had never been any prayer, or demand, or order for payments of interest on this account.
The judgment of the Court ( 121) against each defendant is for interest "from January 12, 1945, in the
sum of $1,338.30." January 12th is the date on which the
equipment was sold. Assuming that an accounting was
then due plaintiff, as the trial Court and this Court have
found, there seems to be no basis in law for the charging
of interest immediately to one of the partners, before a
balance was struck.
This judgment was entered July 12,1952. That is exactly six years and six months after the date on which
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the equipment was sold, and from which the interest
was dated. It is of some, but not major importance on
this, that we are unable to arrive at the figure found by
the Court. In the absence of a contract, the legal rate of
interest of 6% (44-0-1) would seem to apply .. For six and
one-half years this would amount to 39% and 39% of the
$2,97 4.01 on which it is based, would be $1,159.86, instead
of $1338.30 (122).
40 Am. Jur., P. 383:
"362.

Dissolution or Termination of Finn.-

On the dissolution of a partnership, interest is
not ordinarily allowable as between the partners
during the period of settlement of the partnership
affairs if there is no unnecessary delay or improper use of the partnership funds, since the delay which is necessary and incidental to the winding up of the partnership business cannot be
ascribed to one partner more than another. This
is true even though the interest of the partners
may be unequal. However, there are a few authorities, for the most part earlier ones, which
take the view that in adjusting partnership account~ it is proper to Inake a rest at the time of
dissolution of the firm and allow interest from
that time upon balances then due the respective
partners.
* * *
"Interest may be allowable after a judgment
according to which a definite amount is found to
be owing from one partner to another which is
payable immediately. But there must be default in
payment by a partner to his co-partner, and not
merely retention of an ascertained balance, in
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order to 'U'arraut the allowan<'e of iule,rcst after
dissolution."

40 Am. Jur., P. 385
"86±.-Unreasonable Delay in Settlement.-lf
there i~ an unreasonable dPlay in settling the partnership affairs after dissolution or ter1nination
of the partnership, or an unjustifiable refusal to
account, a partner who i~ in possession of the
ftmds of the firn1 and is responsible for the delay
or refusal1nay, on equitable grounds, be charged
with interest on such funds frmn the tilne when
he should haYe accounted.''

We simply point out again in this connection that
there has been no delay, so far as settlmnent of the partnership account is concerned, due to us. It has been due
entirely to the clain1 of unjustifiable damages on the
part of plaintiff, and his demand that the accounting
basis be rejected.
While the following section is not directly in point
on our situation, as are sections 362 and 364 of American
Jurisprudence above, there is this statement with reference to interest generally, by this author which might
at first appear to give the Court discretion in the matter
of interest here.
40 Am. Jur., P. 377
"353. Generally.-While it is quite impossible to lay down any unbending rule on the question whether interest should be allowed or disallowed on partnership accounts, the general rule
appears to be that in the absence of an agreement
to the contrary, interest is not to be allowed on
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partnership accounts until after a balance is
struck, but may be charged if under the circumstances of the particular case the equities so require. Its allowance or disallowance is, to a large
extent, discretionary with the court, and depends
largely on the circumstances of the particular
case."
This author in thus discussing the matter of equities
and discretion cites in support of this statement the Annotation in 66 A.L.R. commencing on Page 3.
At Page 22 of this note there is a general statement
which is substantially the same as that just quoted, as
follows:
''It may be said that, ordinarily in the settlement of partnership accounts, interest should not
be allowed until after a balance is struck on a
settlement between the partners, unless there is a
different agreement between them or unless under
the peculiar facts and circumstances, the equities
demand that interest be charged."
The author then cites in note 61, on page 22 a number
of cases. These cases and all of them where interest
is allowed appear to relate to situations like that set
forth above in 'Sec. 364, where there is unjustifiable delay
by a partner in making payment. This note cites two or
three cases on Page 23 pointing out that there must be
a special agreement or, as stated in one of them, "some
very special and peculiar state of facts."
On Page 23 is cited a case where a partner unjustifiably overdrew his account and another where the
accounts and also the funds were concealed by one part48
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ner, who refused an accounting. These indicate the eharacter of the ''yery special" <>ircmn~tances which might
justify interest. And ther~ is also cited at Page ~-l- another case which is important here:
lrilson r. lrilkinsou, (Ga.) :.;3 S.E. D09, and the holding is stated as follows:
"upon an eqnitahlt> petition by one partner
against another for a settle1nent of the partnership accounts, interest is not generally allowable
in favor of one as against the other upon an
unpaid balance; that, to authorize the allowance
of such interest, the particular facts upon which
interest is clain1ed and allowed nn1st not only be
alleged in the petition, and proved on the trial,
hut the findings of fact upon this issue must be
favorable to the contention of the plaintiff as an
indispensable predieate for the allowance of such
interest in the final decree."
So that again we have no pleading here, as we suggested above, otherwise, evidence might have been offered that would even more completely indicate the fault
for the delay. There is no finding that we are at fault
on this.
To avoid possible confusion on this, and perhaps
anticipate a contention that might be made by plaintiff,
we point out that the fraud in colluding to terminate
this partnership doesn't, so far as we can see from the
cases collected in these notes or in the general digests,
have any bearing on his question.
The so-called conspiracy and joint action to exclude
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plaintiff was the thing that resulted in equity giving to
plaintiff a cause of action for the accounting he had
a~ked. The right and the basis of the accounting ordered
were just as if he had not been excluded, at all. In other
words, the equity Court had extended the term of plaintiff's partnership at will and had made it a partnership
for the whole term of this operation.
'rhe entire operation, when this decision of the Court
was made and when the accounting was ordered, had been
finished and ended. The things to be included in the accounting ordered was then fully recited (90) in the Order.
The only, or "very special" acts that could thereafter
happen to justify interest, didn't happen at all so far as
defendants are concerned. And, there is no claim or finding that any such did occur.
The fact is that Mr. Street has not received the
money that might be due him on this particular settlement for the reason that Mr. Siegel can't pay out the
money until this account is settled and; as indicated in
the citations above, if one partner is entitled to interest,
the other one is too.
In any event l\1r. Street has clearly not delayed the
settlement of this account. This defendant has stated to
the Court, before and now, that he is ready to pay. The
plaintiff, by his pleadings and repeated contentions for
damages in lieu of the partnership settlement, has alone
delayed it.

Ice v. Kilworth, (Kan.) 114 P. 857, and Riebel v.
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<

Jfullcr, (~linn.) ~~G N.,r. D~-t, GG A.L.R. 1, are two ea::-;PH
holding that interest is not chargeable even on advances
made by one partner to the partnership until a halmH·e
is ~truck, in the ahsenee of an agremnent therefor.

Slwlkiu

l'.

Sludkin, GG K.E. :2d G-1-t, 118 A.L.R. 629.

'rhe opinion of the ~Iassaclrn~rtts Supreme Court in
this case is son1ewhat helpful on this point. Here the
two of the partners secretly drew out substantial surns
of money wrongfully. Smne of the n1oney taken was entered in the books as having been paid out for "purchases~' and "cash purchases" ( P. 635). Other money
collected was withheld by thern and not turned in at all
(P. 636). On such amounts, so in effect stolen and kept,
the referee allowed interest and the Court sustained this
"under the circun1stances," after stating that "as a rule,
interest is not chargeable arnong partners in the absence
of some agreement."
The date at which interest should commence was an
issue between the parties and this was computed to the
date when an order was entered settling the accounting,
although the actual decree was not entered until about
three months later (P. 639). We point this out particularly because even under those circumstances interest
wa~ not allowed from the time that an accounting was
due and was demanded, but only from the date that the
balance was struck. On this the opinion says :
"We think it was proper for the trial judge to
order that it be con1puted to the date when the in-
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nocent party would be in the position to receive
what was due him."
We are entirely agreeable that interest be charged
from the date when the plaintiff here will put himself in
position to receive the funds derived from this operation,
and from this accounting.
rrlwre i~, we believe, no authority allowing interest
to a party while he refuses to accept settlement; or any
authority, for allowing the interest charged here.

POINT \T.

rr WAS ERROR TO REJECT AND STRIKE DEFENDANT'S ALLEGATIONS AND TO REFUSE rro
CONSIDER PLAINTIFF'S LACHES OR INEQUITABLE DELAYS, INEQUITABLE CLAIMS, AND INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AND FAILURE TO DO OR
OFFER TO DO EQUITY.
While we do not waive the point as stated, or the
striking of our defenses, we will not argue these matters
at length. vVe will briefly discuss what appears to be the
failure below to consider the inequity of rewarding and
enriching plaintiff, far beyond any possible loss.
This is an action in equity. After it had been de-~lared and affirmed as such and the items of the required
which this plaintiff filed demurrers and a motion to
strike.
The Court sustained these objections in a minute
entry ( 42). Thus, for example, was eliminated from our
answer the objection (46) that damages for rent were
not pleadable in the case as laid and that rental of the·
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accounting defined (90), the plaintiff hy his supplPnwntal
complaint demanded drunages based on alleged past and
future rentals in excess of $140,000.00 (20), nnd tlwn'" after on the trial prayed for $50,000.00 additional a~ puni- /
tive damages ( 21). rro this fornle\· demand, this defend- .
ant filed an ans\Yer ~ 44) setting up eertain defenses, to
t¥ equipment was not c~nt~ntplated, and that the .eq~ipz: / ment wa~, in fact, operated as agreed; also our obJectwn
/ that future profits were not pleadable in an action on a
/ partnership at will: also the claim that the plaintiff was
/ not entitled to earnings fro:tit:the operation of this defend_,i ant's O-\Vn equip1nent. ..:-\lso was eliminated the allegation
-.:I that plaintiff had never indicated to defendant that he
~- ( wanted to possess this partnership equipment or desired
-~ \ to participate in this operation, and that this defendant
·Jhad invested additional funds in expenses and equip. m. ent (48), and that plaintiff had.waited and speculated
·!
(•49) on the outcome.
_
.
~

•,

~·

>-<-;r-~>-

--

\Vhile we were thus deprived of going into some of
these defenses as such, we desire now briefly to point out
that this account properly settled will give plaintiff
not alone the only remedy available, but also a remedy
which is adequate.
Plaintiff had no investment in this partnership. The
partnership property was paid for by this defendant.
Plaintiff ran no risk, therefore, of loss of capital. He
devoted no time to this business, and apparently did not
expect to. The only equipment that the partnership had
was actually operated full time. It could do no more than
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it did. It could not have been used and it never was intended to be used for any different purposes than that
to which it was put. It was used and operated by the
party that plaintiff had agreed would use and operate it,
and at the costs, and for the rate of return expected.
Plaintiff, at the beginning, as this Court found, had
proposed relinquishing all his interest for $1,000.00 (P.
535). He had no money in it, and his partnership had no
term of existence. Notwithstanding this, the proper accounting will give him
g L about twice what he proposed selling out for.
1

A note 21 A.L.R., at Page 75, dealing with damages
recoverable even where there is a term of existence provided for the partnership, says:

"In fact it has been said that the true measure
of damages is the actual1noney value of the plaintiff's interest in the contract of partnership at the
time of the breach * * * ."
Citing Reiter v. Morton, 96 Pa. 229.
The plaintiff went ahead operating his business, just
as he had engaged and always intended doing; and devoted his whole time and attention to it, so reaping all
the profits fron1 this, and now also half the net from this
equipment.
By applying the principle that equity would consider
as done what this Court concluded should have been done
under the agreement contemplated here, and thereby
(1) treating the title to the equipment as having actually
54
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

passed to the partnership; and (2) treating the operation
of it as having been for the benefit of the partnership;
and (3) applying to the operation the terms of the attempted agremnent of partnership, this Court has given
all that plaintiff could have expected if there had been no
attempt to disrupt the conten1plated partnership arrangements.
In 21 A.L.R. at 73, the author cites a number of cases
in support of the stateinent there made that even where
there is a contract for a definite term, and a breach by
dissolution,
"the dmnages recoverable include the value
of the profits which the plain tiff otherwise would
have received, or the value to him of the continuance of the agreement during the covenanted
term."
The Court ~xpressly (118) found that the "agreement provides,"~ was to receive one-half.
In any event, this operation produced net for the
partnership almost the total cost of their equipment,
in approximately 15 months time, which seems to be a
very good return. And the partners never paid anything
for or on the equipment used.
19 .·I m.. Jur., P. 188, Sec. 240:

Here the author pointed out that in some circunlstances a person seeking equity must offer to do equity.
And that, in general, a person lllust do equity as a condition to the granting of relief in equity.
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19 Am. Jur., P. 319, Sec. 462-463:
Here the author points out that Courts of equity
will consider whether the conduct of one who seeks relief
has been in accordance with the standards of equity,
and also said that:
"Nothing can call this Court into activity but
conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence.
Where these are wanting the Court is passive
and does nothing."
"By appealing to the equitable jurisdiction,
the complainant is deemed tc have submitted
himself to the Court's decision as to what is neces~
sary to do justice to the defendant as determined
in the light of equitable principles."
"The principle is as applicable to a party defendant as it is a party cornplainant."
It doesn't seem equitable to us, under the circumstances here, for a party to claim the exorbitant
amount claimed here as rental damages; nor does it seem
equitable to award to plaintiff, in addition to the amount
due him under the accounting, the $5,000.00 as general,
or the $5,000.00 as punitive damages. These are not only
not legally -..available, but they have not been claimed
by plaintiff by any allegation, or established by any evidence, but they have, nevertheless, been added by the
Court below.
Note, that the findings as cited above of "turmoil
and anxiety" and "dis)fsses and anxieties" (118) are
totally non-existent by any claim or proof.
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On the other hand, consider briefly the treatment
given this defendant here. He alone financed the operation. He has been denied any ren1uneration for his time,
or for his !elephone expenses or automobile expenseH
in making calls or trips, or for his legal or accounting
costs paid. He is out all these. He alone risked any capital. The Court has found that he agreed to loan on this
worn and broken down equipment the full cost thereof,
and it is so settled that he did, but it is also conclusive,
as testified by three witnesses in the evidence cited above,
that he got for this equipn1ent only the pron1ise of .Mr.
Roberts to pay him back $4,056.00 of the $4,500.00 that he
paid for it. Also, that only the $56.00 of this had been
paid after six years, and up until the trial of this cause
of action. This 1936 equipment was then fifteen years old,
the buyer had gone in the hole on it, and it seems to be
reasonable to conclude that this defendant will never
receive this $4,000.00.
It see1ns to us that it would be wholly inequitable
and unjust to impose upon him the additional amounts
of damages and punitive damages and so-called idle
time rentals and interest aggregating $12,204.30 over
and above the amount due from defendant to plaintiff
on the accounting. This is so, even if plaintiff had a legal
right to such damages, which he has not, and if defendant
had been given notice and opportunity to defend as to
these, which he was not.

He is plainly required tp dig deeply in his own
pocket the amounts paid and to be paid on the accounting
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even after that is reduced as above outlined. How, in
equity, can he be penalized by this $12,000.00 in addition to the $4,000.00 which he is out on the equipment,
when he has run the only risks of this . . . operation,
and has gained nothing?
And particularly, on what principle of equity, or
how in good conscience, is the plaintiff entitled to receive
this great additional reward and gratuity; and on what
can it be claimed to be based~ Plaintiff elected the only
remedy he had.
CONCLUSION
In this equity case charging defendants with uniting
in disrupting a partnership at will, or charging the excluding of a partner in such a partnership from the operation of partnership property, there can be no recovery
of the dan1ages assessed, either cmnpensatory or punitive. On this the law appears to be firmly settled.
And, even if this were a partnership for a term, since
plaintiff elected after such partnership operation had
ended to sue in equity for an accounting and actually
procured such to be ordered and supplied, such damages,
if pleaded, could not be added to the judgn1ent settling the
account.
And certainly this could not be legally done with no
pleadings or claims to base them on, or to enable the
defendants to defend as to them, and no evidence to
sustain then1.
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Furthermore, the election of the ettui table n'BH'd.\·
of accounting under the law applicable to such a partnership at will and in thi~ 8ituation would seen1 to constitute an election of rernedies which would bar the pleading of causes of actions for sueh danwgP~, if ~nch hnd
been a tten1pted.
K o aets, exeept the attempt to disrupt or the disrupting of a partnership at will, and the exelusion of a partner as above stated, are plead rd as a cause of action here.
And so the trial Court clearly went off the track that
had been laid as a Lasis of recovery at all here; or any
track which could be laid under the eircumstanres, in
adding such judg1nent for dmnage.
These principles apply to the allowance of $1,932.00
rental charges for so-called idle time of equipment, as do
also the authorities cited in support of Point I. And,
too, this finding as to rental value damages is not :-;upported by any evidence as shown under the discussion of
this under Point II. ~lore could have been said as to
this item of damage, but this "idle time" danmge had not
been claimed by plaintiff, and cannot be justified or supported at all, and it may not he defended on this appeal.
~rhe

addition of interest by one partner against the
other, in the amount of $1,338.30, is likewise subject to
the principles cited in support of Points I and II in the
matter of pleading, claim or notice. And, in addition, we
have shown that it is basically contrary to law.
The insurance policy premium, while not of great
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importance, appears to have been improperly disallowed
as an operative expense deduction. It was not objected
to or put in, dispute and it was sustained by evidence
offered, without objection. It is one of the larger expense items disallowed.
With the elimination from the balance found on the
accounting of one-half of this rental damage item of $1,932.00, discussed under Point II, and with the slight adjustment which we believe is required by Point III, the
account itself as struck by the Court iR in the amount of
$1,922.73, due plaintiff. We have not contended for any
other or further adjustment or reduction. We have tendered a full accounting as ordered by the Court and it is
the remedy to which plaintiff is, and has been found to
be, entitled.
As pointed out, for all that plaintiff actually put into
this partnership undertaking, or all that he agreed or
intended to put into it, this is also a very good return.
· On the other hand, further to penalize this defendant,
and particularly in the additional amounts allowed here,
would be wholly unconscionable, inequitable and unjust.
We ask again that the Court settle this account so
that this defendant can be able to make payment herein
and be authorized to use the partnership funds in his
hands insofar as such funds will enable him to make such
payment, of the balance due on the account.
We respectfully submit that the allowance of compensatory, idle time rental, and punitive damages, and
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also interest on the account, except on the balance when
struck, should be reversed and these portions of the
conclusions and decree elilninated before final judgment
settling the account.
That the Court should affirm the judgment on the accounting, but in the corrected and legal amount.
Respectfully submitted,
MULLINER, PRINCE & MULLINER

Attorneys for Appellant, Max Siegel
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